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Abstract
A central challenge in understanding public opinion shifts is identifying whose opin-
ions change. Political economists try to uncover this by exploring voters’ economic vul-
nerability, particularly the relationship between labor-market risk and redistribution pref-
erences. Predominantly, however, such work imputes risk from occupational or sectoral
characteristics. Due to within-occupational inequality in exposure to risk, considerable
variation remains unexplored. I propose an individual-level, dynamic account of risk in-
ferred from job tenure, contract type and expectations of job security. These aspects, im-
portantly, account for individual variation in risk and the possibility that one’s experience
of risk may change across time. The results indicate the usefulness of this approach to risk
in understanding changes in social spending preferences.
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Introduction
The past few decades have seen a remarkable transformation in labor markets across the
advanced industrial societies: employment opportunities decreased in certain industries and
occupations, and not others. This development is attributed to increasing reliance on techno-
logical change, the embeddedness of production and trade in global markets, and the decline
in Fordism (Autor et al., 2003; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Iversen and Cusack, 2000). As
the labor share declined across the OECD and domestic labor markets became more reliant on
precarious jobs, citizens’ economic experiences and redistribution preferences have attracted
a great deal of scholarly attention. As prior work has shown, vote choice is largely driven by
changes in economic circumstances and concerns over taxation (Margalit, 2013; Ahlquist et al.,
2020).
A core result in this literature holds that voters are motivated by self-interest in form-
ing redistribution preferences. In particular, significant changes in one’s economic standing,
whether realized (e.g. job loss) or expected (e.g. a sharp increase in one’s likelihood of get-
ting unemployed), are predicted to shape these preferences, well beyond what a voter’s income
would suggest (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Rehm, 2009; Margalit, 2019). This is found true for
individuals working in industries or occupations exposed to the risk of automation, outsourcing
and offshoring, or necessitating more specific skill investments (Walter, 2017; Thewissen and
Rueda, 2019; Iversen and Soskice, 2001). In brief, citizens working in risky occupations or in-
dustries are expected to support social spending more than their less risk exposed counterparts.
For the interpretation of these results to hold, one needs first to assume that the same peo-
ple would hold different, maybe even opposite, views had their economic circumstances been
different than the observed ones. Such a causal implication is not however substantiated with
empirical support, as most work relies on cross-sectional comparisons. More substantively,
this research is typically static in nature, as individuals’ preferences and economic situation is
observed and quantified only at a given point in time. An open question therefore is whether
this empirical relationship is dynamic in nature, specifically whether individuals’ preferences
change in response to shifts in personal circumstances.
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This is an important question for understanding shifts in public opinion and the malleabil-
ity of preferences. For example, following the crisis, conventional wisdom expected public
opinion to shift left, but support for populism increased instead (Funke et al., 2016).1 To the
extent that economic hardship is correlated with support for radical parties (Guiso et al., 2020),
exploring the dynamic nature of labor market risk could contribute to a better understanding of
the changes in the political landscape. Relatedly, it is important to understand just how volatile
voters’ preferences are to be able to anticipate what level of economic insecurity is likely to
contribute to changes in public opinion (O’Grady, 2019).
Apart from the methodological implication emphasizing the need for dynamic empirical
work, this question has further theoretical substance. Individual-risk is typically captured by
inferring individuals’ economic experiences from occupational or sectoral information. This
is conceptually appealing as it aims to capture supply and demand for a certain skill set. At
the same time, individuals’ risk level is typically defined based on the tasks or characteristics
of their occupation: routine, specific or general, offshorable or geographically immobile. Im-
portantly, this exercise captures the source of risk individuals may experience. This implies,
however, that workers within the same industry or occupation experience labor market risk in
the same way. Due to the sunk costs necessitated in acquiring skills or the mere difficulty in
adapting an occupation’s task structure, individual risk emerges conceptually as sticky (see, for
example, Thewissen and Rueda (2019)) and homogeneous within an occupation. In reality,
within-occupation inequality is rising, but not because of changes in task structures (Iversen
and Soskice, 2019; Eckardt, 2019).
Aggregate shocks or local trends make within-occupation inequality especially prominent
across firms and regions (Boeri et al., 2019; Greenstone et al., 2010; Iversen and Soskice,
2019; Autor et al., 2013). While it is normally assumed that local markets are in equilibrium,
geographical differences in labor market outcomes persist across time (Kline and Moretti, 2014;
Overman and Puga, 2002), partly because of local shocks (Amior and Manning, 2018) and
partly because of insufficient labor mobility when local firms relocate elsewhere (Manning and
1While some work shows that right-wing parties and less moderate candidates capitalize on crises (Dorn et al.,
2020; Funke et al., 2016), it is nevertheless true that a prolonged crisis may affect parties more uniformly across
the ideological spectrum (Lindvall, 2017).
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Petrongolo, 2017). Furthermore, recent work shows that the share of tasks that can be done
remotely varies across workers within occupations or industries (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020),
while others find that not all workers in firms that close down or relocate perceive a subsequent
job risk (Klandermans et al., 2010). This is where individual labor market experience could
address existing challenges: it can account for within-occupation variation in risk at a given
time and trace how this risk evolves over time.
In brief, work proposing that risk clusters at the occupation level may overlook variation
within occupations in exposure to risk and possible transitions between secure and precarious
employment within a given occupation. Therefore, I suggest that while most research explor-
ing redistribution preferences can very well capture average differences across occupations in
employment opportunities and related welfare preferences, it cannot identify within-occupation
inequality in risk – that is, which individuals experience risk, how their risk unfolds over time
and how this labor market dynamic impacts public opinion change in support of the welfare
state.
This paper takes an initial step in addressing these challenges, by proposing a measure
of risk that is not imputed to respondents from occupational or sector information, but is rather
informed by individual employment characteristics. In doing so, I make the following two
contributions.
First, I recognize a dynamic risk component and account empirically for individual spe-
cific variation by relying on a long-run panel data. Although this strategy does not entirely elim-
inate all possible inferential difficulties resultant from risk not occurred randomly, it does allow
me to control for key individual characteristics such as motivation or early family upbringing.
A further advantage of analysing individual experiences is that these are less susceptible to
selection effects than individuals’ occupational choice.
Second, I explore individuals’ labor market experience through their employment char-
acteristics. In brief, I maintain that individuals will demand higher insurance against risk when
they are in riskier jobs, not necessarily in riskier occupations. In fact, I show that job vulnera-
bility is a much better predictor of social spending demand than previously thought (Schwander
and Hausermann, 2013). Focusing on individuals, I translate the likely implications of within-
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occupation heterogeneity in risk and its individual-specific evolution onto job characteristics.
Expanding on earlier work focusing on employment status (Rueda, 2007; Burgoon and Dekker,
2010; Marx and Picot, 2020), I suggest that both subjective and objective employment risks
matter in forming redistribution preferences, but that dichotomizing risk is ill-equipped for in-
creasingly transient and insecure working patterns. In the spirit of a dynamic account, I suggest
that not only the current status but also the frequency with which one experiences change, mat-
ters. Therefore, I introduce as a measure of employment risk a workers’ job tenure, alongside
measures previously considered such as contract type and subjective job insecurity. Finally, I
identify these three characteristics to map onto three employment risk types – those in secure
jobs, those expecting or likely to lose their jobs and those who have lost their jobs. I extend this
framework to the study of redistribution preferences and contribute to a growing literature on
the micro-level link between personal exposure to risk and individual-level political preferences
(Margalit, 2019; Hacker, 2019; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019).
By making these two contributions, the paper proposes a new method to classify labor
market risk and shows that labor market transitions (not just downward) substantially impact on
welfare state preferences – e.g. decreasing one’s risk makes her up to 5 percentage points less
likely to support redistribution. At a time when populist appeals are on the rise and concerns
over taxation often dominate the political discourse, this papers’ findings not only contribute
to understanding public opinion shifts but also speak to the comparative government literature
more broadly. For example, Guiso et al. (2020) show that becoming more economically inse-
cure decreases the likelihood to turnout in elections. If risk, however, does not cluster within
clearly identifiable socio-economic groups like occupations, as this paper argues, then the im-
pact on turnout could be interpreted as parties’ hardship in mobilizing scattered economically
insecure individuals.
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Variation in Risk and Preferences
A challenge in understanding public opinion changes is identifying whose preferences
change. Of particular interest is tracing how social spending preferences respond to changes in
economic circumstances, especially those related to individuals’ exposure to risk in the labor
market. The argument I put forward proposes two sources of variation that one needs to theo-
retically account for: within-occupation variation in risk at a given point in time, and worker
specific variation over time. Whilst the two may be related, I identify distinct job characteristics
that closely track these dimensions, both observable and objectively classifiable, and unmea-
surable in objective terms, but where subjective risk provides leverage. Akin to existing work, I
subscribe to an insurance logic through which these indicators are likely to impact on political
preferences.
Occupational Risk
A series of influential articles situate the source of labor market risk at the occupational
level. For example, Iversen and Soskice (2001) argue that the portability of one’s skills across
firms, skill-specificity, determine which workers are likely to experience unemployment. They
maintain that workers with specific skills are valuable to only one firm or occupation, whereas
those with general skills are likely to find employment in a different occupation or industry,
a fact which lowers the latter’s risk exposure. Technological change or globalization are also
expected to impact an occupation’s risk. Those in occupations least reliant on repetitive tasks
(e.g. managers) or tasks that cannot be performed abroad (e.g. drivers) are expected to be
least exposed to labor market risks (Thewissen and Rueda, 2019; Walter, 2017). While rou-
tinization suggests a skill-bias in the experience of unemployment risk, increasing reliance on
artificial intelligence is expected to expose highly skilled workers to the negative labor market
effects of automation (Webb, 2019). As involuntary switches between occupations are more
costly than between industries, the levels of unemployment of specific occupations, often mea-
sured through occupational unemployment rates, is considered informative about workers’ risk
(Rehm, 2009).
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NOTE: y-axis denotes the ranked risk of each available ISCO-2 occupation based on routine task intensity (RTI), skill-specificity,
offshorability (Offshore) and occupational unemployment rates (OUR). On the x-axis, ISCO-2 occupations are ordered with respect
to their ranked risk on the skill specificity measure. Within each ISCO-2 group, greater vertical spread informs about variation in
risk based on the different source of risk considered.
Importantly, this work explains differences in average levels of risk across occupations.
This is useful for understanding a series of aggregate economic and political outcomes such as
wage polarization, declining union density or inequality (Goos et al., 2014; Hirsch, 2008; Moll
et al., 2021).
Yet, if we are interested in understanding whose opinions change, and we believe this is
driven by exposure to risk, then relying on aggregate data might only tell part of the story. As
work on occupational risk explores different risk sources, it naturally concludes that different
groups are risky – see FIGURE 1. The figure plots on the y-axis the ranked risk of each available
ISCO-2 occupation based on routine task intensity, skill specificity, offshoring and occupational
unemployment rate. If each occupation was identified by all these measures to be similarly risk
exposed, then all observations would fall on the dotted diagonal line.
The fact that these measures map risk quite differently may therefore have important
implications for understanding whose opinions change. Rather than thinking voters in most
occupations are cross-pressured in risk depending on the source one considers, it is more plau-
sible to suggest that work has become more precarious and more unequal within occupations
(Katz and Krueger, 2017; Berger et al., 2018).
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Sources of Individual Variation
Why might individuals working in the same occupation experience risk differently? Al-
though risk may vary across countries (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012), of particular interest is
variation within institutional settings. I explore sources of within-occupation variation in risk
at a given point in time and discuss how this may evolve heterogeneously over time.
Local labor markets are normally assumed to be in equilibrium. But, recent work sug-
gests significant geographical differences in employment outcomes (Kline and Moretti, 2014;
Overman and Puga, 2002). Despite expectations, markets are not converging (Austin et al.,
2018).
Shocks in the labor market may disproportionately impact some regions, given initial dif-
ferences in industry specialization, productivity or migration flows (Autor et al., 2013; Boeri
et al., 2019; Glitz, 2012). Moreover, regional differences are accelerated by recessions or in-
fluenced by past unemployment, and vacancies may fall differently, even when exposed to the
same process, such as routinization (Hershbein and Kahn, 2018; Bartik and Sotherland, 2019).
In fact, such effects are persistent on local labor markets generating long-lasting hysterisis
(Hershbein and Stuart, 2020), even when workers are identical (Bilal, 2020).
Firm characteristics can also influence within-occupation differences in risk. For exam-
ple, firms may respond differently to shocks (Bloom et al., 2016), firing costs and decisions
may vary depending on firm size or employer expectations about economic conditions (Mar-
tins, 2009; Coibion et al., 2020). Additionally, geographical sorting may explain what types
of policies get implemented, such as initiatives aimed at training local workers or expanding
union power (Jensen et al., 2021). Furthermore, local conditions may also reflect local govern-
ment’s success in attracting firms through subsidies or multinational companies (Greenstone
et al., 2010; Slattery, 2018; Setzler and Tintelnot, 2019).
In response, workers may differentially respond to local conditions. For example, loca-
tion sorting may act as an investment that influences the type of future job opportunities (Bilal
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2018). In particular, working in a big city ensures a better match of jobs to
high-quality plants and more valuable experiences (Dauth et al., 2018; Roca and Puga, 2017).
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This matters as jobs at more productive employers could be more stable (Bilal, 2020). At the
other end, insufficient labour mobility when local firms relocate elsewhere may explain spatial
mismatches between unemployment and vacancies (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Manning and
Petrongolo, 2017). This happens, for example, due to declining internal migration related to
workers’ home attachment (Coate and Mangum, 2019). The result, a mismatch between work-
ers skills and demand for that skill, local skills remoteness, implies that if laid off, the workers
have lower re-employment opportunities and at lower wage (Macaluso, 2017).
Workers may also be heterogenously affected, even within-firms and occupations, based
on last-in first-out rules, the type and length of employment, or taste-based discrimination
(Sundstrom, 1992; Davis and Von Wachter, 2011; Egan et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2020).
This suggests that while a worker’s occupation, as income or education, may be a good
predictor of economic insecurity (Jacobs and Newman, 2008), occupations are affected differ-
ently depending on one’s job, firm or location. Therefore, to trace how individual experiences
plan out, we might want to synthesize this information at the individual-level.
Anchoring Risk: An Individual Approach
One way to synthesize these sources of variation is to assert their likely impact on observ-
able risk characteristics, such as contract type or job tenure, and on unobservable characteristics
in objective terms, but where subjective expectations may expose private information.
Objective Risk
Earlier work suggests that contract-type (part-time or full-time) is a reliable measure of
individual risk (King and Rueda, 2008). Indeed, this could contribute to within-occupation
variation in risk observed at a given point in time, as the share of individuals in alternative
work arrangements or wanting to work longer hours has risen sharply in recent years (Katz
and Krueger, 2016; Bell and Blanchflower, 2018). For example, recent work around OECD
suggests that routine jobs based on standard contracts have been replaced by non-standard work
(Codagnone et al., 2016; OECD, 2015, p.10), but this may also be true for low risk occupations
that undergo precarious work, such a gig workers. Contract type may, of course, vary not just
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within-occupations, but also within-firms, as some firms may rely on a mix of fully employed
and part-time workers to resist demands for wage increases from the latter, more protected
employees (Bell and Blanchflower, 2018). Therefore, whether an individual is employed on a
part-time or full-time contract can plausibly be considered an observable risk characteristic that
varies within-occupations.
Employment stability, in particular, the likelihood of lasting matches between firms and
workers may vary, as outlined above, with several firm and individual characteristics. Simply
put, job tenure is likely to vary within-occupations driven by firm characteristics such as pro-
ductivity or size, but also within-individuals, driven, for example, by their propensity to move
when their employer relocates. Yet, this is an employment characteristic that has not been con-
sidered as contributing to workers’ insecurity, despite several reasons why those with longer
job tenure may have lower risk of unemployment.
First, job tenure is a reliable proxy for employment rights, and therefore highly rele-
vant from a legal standpoint. For example, continuous employment is required to qualify for
statutory employment rights or to qualify for the right not to be unfairly dismissed (Fudge and
Owens, 2006). This is particularly important for the growing pool of atypical workers, such
as gig workers, which tend to switch jobs with a high frequency.2 Second, experience that
is both firm- and job-specific cannot be rewarded equally in another company, and therefore,
the incentives to undertake such (firm specific) investments are stronger when there is expec-
tation of long-lasting firm-worker matches (Becker, 1962; Hashimoto, 1981; Hall and Soskice,
2001; Doepke and Gaetani, 2018). Relatedly, those with longer tenure may be more likely to
receive on-the-job training, which not only reduces perceptions of insecurity, but also makes
the worker more valuable (Lebert and Antal, 2016). Third, longer job tenure may imply that
the worker has become more productive at their job than a randomly selected worker, therefore
the firm may have an interest in retaining that worker. Analogous to deterrent effects identified
in Baderin and Barnes (2020) for insecure tenants not willing to invest integrating in the local
community, workers with short tenure may underperform at their job whilst looking for alter-
2‘Before the Internet, it would be really difficult to find someone, sit them down for ten minutes and get
them to work for you” (cited in Prassl (2018)). Although gig workers cannot get fired, they may experience high
volality in work availability, and this could be due to consumer ratings like in Uber, worker ratings or even worker
qualification demands like in Mturk (Prassl, 2018).
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native job arrangements, increasing thus their chances of getting unemployed. Therefore, firms
that rely heavily on atypical workers may have lower productivity, which may matter for their
survival. For example, Iversen and Soskice (2019) note that ‘knowledge-bearing companies
range from great long-lived multinationals to short-lived high-tech start-ups in agglomerations
of such companies’, and indeed, such businesses vary significant in their degree of market risk.
Finally, a last-in, first-out logic could apply, particularly for struggling firms and industries
(Caggese et al., 2019; Von Below and Thoursie, 2010; Bender and Sloane, 1999). Therefore,
relying on the time a worker has spent in a job can be used as an observable risk characteristic
that varies within-occupation, and potentially within-individuals over time.
Subjective Risk
The role of expectations in decision-making is well known, but so far few empirical pa-
pers investigate the impact of subjective expectations on economic and political outcomes. For
example, home price expectations influence individuals’ selling decisions (Bottan and Perez-
Truglia, 2020), macroeconomic or job loss expectations affect consumption behavior (Pettinic-
chi and Vellekoop, 2019; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020), perceptions of crime and expectations of
job loss determine redistribution preferences (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016; O’Grady, 2019;
Margalit, 2013). This suggests that although correlated with objective indicators of actual job
loss (Stephens Jr, 2004), subjective expectations can still have a distinct, direct effect on pref-
erences and behavior (Rainer and Siedler, 2008; Pettinicchi and Vellekoop, 2019).
Consequently, focusing on objective characteristics may only capture part of the story.
‘Losing a job flipping burgers and finding a new one as a parking lot attendant may not mean
much of a pay cut, but it certainly doesn’t mean things are looking up either’ (Jacobs and
Newman, 2008, p.86). So, what might subjective expectations capture additionally?
It is useful to remember that risk in the labor market captures both the probability of job
loss and the severity of that loss in terms of future prospects of re-employment (Iversen and
Soskice, 2001).3 Subjective insecurity may be informed by and highly correlated with objective
3The probability of job loss does not refer to a case of pure uncertainty nor of pure risk, but is chosen to reflect
the intermediate cases where workers can assign a higher or lower probability of unemployment, even without
knowledge of the specific value of that probability (Baderin and Barnes, 2020).
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insecurity as far as the probability of job loss is concerned. Even then, perceptions of unem-
ployment risk may vary across individuals with the same objective risk of unemployment. This
happens because subjective expectations reveal private information available to workers about
subsequent realizations of job loss or re-employment (Dickerson and Green, 2012; Hendren,
2017), such as employer inflation expectations or home attachment (Coibion et al., 2020; Coate
and Mangum, 2019).
The two indicators might also differ with respect to the second dimension concerning
re-employment: ‘From neatly coifed executives to aproned production workers, once secure
futures now seem threatened’ (Jacobs and Newman, 2008). Based on occupational measures,
we can learn about differences in the average re-employment opportunities across occupations.
However, as these vary across institutions, firms and regions, a worker might be knowledgeable
of the probability and severity of job loss well beyond what her occupation, contract type or
length might imply. Indeed, this could be why not all workers perceive high insecurity when
firms close down (Klandermans et al., 2010). On the flipside, if a worker is not actually aware
of the probability of losing her job, then surely relying only on objective measures is unlikely
to fully capture the extent to which that worker supports social spending. In fact, Campbell
et al. (2007) show that subjective expectations better track job loss than observed objective
characteristics, and argue this happens because of private information available to workers,
which cannot be captured in conventional objective variables.
In brief, subjective expectations of unemployment are generally correct, though individ-
uals may overweight some experiences (Campbell et al., 2007; Conlon et al., 2018; Roth and
Wohlfart, 2020). However, as subjective insecurity is likely to capture otherwise unavailable
information such as relationship to employer, performance on the job (especially important
for gig workers), the use of both subjective and objective measures is therefore a qualitative
improvement on work using only subjective or only objective measures.
Summary
Based on these considerations, I propose a dynamic approach that integrates the objective
and subjective facets of risk and maps the labor force into three groups, as shown in FIGURE
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ρ3
NOTE Full-time denotes the standard binary classification of individuals’ contract type based on their contractual working hours
(part-time vs full-time). Job Tenure captures the number of years an individual is employed with one (and the same) employer,
as described in Figure D.1. This is represented by a binary classification differentiating those who have continuously worked
with the same employer and those who have not. Job Secure is represented a binary, distinguishing people who consider their
job to be secure from those who consider it insecure. As in any standard Venn diagram, the figure plots logical sets as circles
within an enclosing rectangle (the universal set) and common elements of the sets are represented by intersection of the circles.
2: those without a job, those employed in a precarious job, and those employed in a secure
job, each with a corresponding risk but also employment opportunity. This implies that the risk
of the unemployed (realized risk ρ3) differs from that experienced by precarious workers (risk
ρ2). This also means that secure workers (risk ρ1), although low, do experience labor market
risk.4
Implication for Preferences
As modern welfare states redistribute income and provide social insurance (Barr, 2001),5
individuals are not only motivated by redistributive calculations, but also by insurance motives
4The new divide is not synonymous with the insider-outsider conflict identified by Rueda (2007) as insiders
can now experience risk, even if lower than outsiders (Iversen and Soskice, 2019).
5The insurance function arises due to imperfect information, risk and uncertainty in the labor market, and, it is
the main reason why individuals cannot privately insurance themselves (Barr, 2001), though see Ansell (2014).
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(Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). Extending the work of Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard
(1981), a growing literature finds that exposure to risk, in particular in the labor market, in-
creases support for social spending (Margalit, 2019; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019). I apply
this insurance logic and derive similar expectations in Appendix A. In brief, I expect a dynamic
relationship between risk and social spending preferences, meaning an individual transiting into
a more (less) secure job is expected to decrease (increase) her demand for insurance compared
to her time in a less (more) secure job.
One key feature of this expectation is that individuals can change their risk by transiting
not only into a less secure job, but also into a more secure one. Consequently, studying how
individuals respond to change is important in capturing individuals’ responsiveness to risk,6
and ultimately understanding public opinion changes.
Data and Measurement
To explore empirically the proposed dynamic relationship, individual-level panel data is
desirable for three main reasons. First, identifying changes in risk requires detailed information
about the individual’s current and past experience in the labor market and associated social
spending preferences. Second, panel data is preferred to cross-sectional data because it enables
modelling individual specific variation. Third, panel data is needed in order to objectively
measure job tenure. In addition, a long-run panel is ideal in order to allow the observation of
sufficient labor market transitions and subsequent social spending preferences.
To meet these criteria, I employ a long-run panel data following individuals from 1999
to 2014 from Switzerland. The Swiss Household Panel (SHP) is a stratified random sample of
private households, representative of the non-institutional resident population in Switzerland
(Voorpostel et al., 2016). It started in 1999 and it includes two sample refreshments, one in 2004
and one in 2013. Crucially, the SHP measures social spending preferences as well as perceived
job security, contract type and detailed information about each individual’s employment history
and job characteristics.
6This is likely to matter most when the individual experiences large changes in her economic circumstances
(O’Grady, 2019).
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The dependent variable used in this analysis is captured by the question ‘Are you in
favour of a decrease or in favour of an increase in federal social spending?’. Potential answers
include ‘in favour of an increase’, ‘neither’ or ‘in favour of a decrease’. This question does
not distinguish a redistribution logic from an insurance one. Though many other scholars have
previously used such measures (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 2009), it is clear that al-
though serious, the problem is not ‘fatal’ given that the two preferences are highly correlated
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Nevertheless, in two waves, corresponding to the years 2011
and 2014, respondents are asked about several social policy issues, including spending on un-
employment benefits. FIGURE D.4 shows the positive correlation between demand for federal
social spending and unemployment benefits spending.
The question asks specifically about federal social spending preferences. Switzerland
has been a federal state since 1848. It resembles the US’ dual-federalism in that there are clear
divisions of power between the federal and the canton level. It is essential thus for respondents
to report their desired federal spending level rather than the canton ones. Social insurance in
Switzerland reveals a story of progressive transfer of power from the canton to the federal level
(as happened in Germany or the US), especially on matters of insurance. The contemporaneous
Swiss system places responsibilities for unemployment, sickness and disability insurance with
the federal government rather than cantons (Noel, 2004; Obinger et al., 2005).
Three questions are used in order to construct the individual-based risk in the labor mar-
ket. The first, related to individual’s perceived job security, asks the respondents ‘Would you
say that your job is very secure, quite secure, a bit insecure or very insecure?’. Respondents
are given four options, ranging from ‘very secure’ to ‘very insecure’. The question is partic-
ularly useful since it avoids creating a mid-point response bias, usually associated with Likert
items. The second, straightforwardly asks respondents who are employed whether they are
part-time or full-time ‘Currently, in your main job, do you work part-time or full-time?’. The
third question asks whether the individual has changed her job in the last 12 months, with po-
tential answers being ‘yes, only jobs (with the same employer)’, ‘yes, employers (same job)’,
‘yes, jobs and employers’, ‘no, neither jobs nor employers’. This third variable allows the con-
struction of the job continuation measure. Based on these measures, individuals’ employment
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characteristics complying with at least two high risk indicators are classified as risk ρ2 and
those with at least two low risk indicators are classified with risk ρ1, as depicted in FIGURE 2.
Income is measured at the household level and is adjusted for the number of household
members and their age by employing the OECD-modified equivalence scale (Atkinson et al.,
1994; Hagenaars et al., 1994). This measure is equivalent to the cost of living price index: it
estimates the ratio between a household’s income compared with that of a single individual’s
income who enjoys the same utility as that household (Browning et al., 2013). By accounting
thus for the number of a household’s members, this measure avoids under- or over-estimations
of the relative wealth of a household or of the relative impact of income shocks for any given
household. In order to account for the skewness of the income distribution, the household
income is log-transformed. The measurement of other covariates is described in the Appendix.
Results
I begin by examining respondents’ baseline social preferences informed by their risk type,
irrespective of income or other individual characteristics. Based on the theoretical framework,
this attribute alone should have an independent effect on spending demand. FIGURE 3 reports
the preferences among all labor market participants from the pooled sample. Informed only by
their associated risk-status, those classified as least exposed to risk, ρ1, are likely to demand
about 7% less spending than those in a precarious job (risk ρ2) and about 12% less than the un-
employed (realized risk, ρ3). Similarly, there is a sizeable difference between the unemployed
and the high-risk workers of about 5%. This reaffirms the importance of accounting for risk,
as emphasized in the insurance models. That said, it also tentatively shows that risk can be
synthesized at the individual level.
When accounting for the individuals’ position in the income distribution, higher incomes
are expected to inform lower support for redistribution. As individuals are expected to be moti-
vated both by redistributive and insurance motivations, their spending preferences are predicted
to be decreasing in income and increasing in risk, as in FIGURE A.1. This expectation is cor-
roborated in FIGURE 4.
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NOTE: The bar plot shows the average support for social spending by risk type accompanied by 95% confidence intervals. Individuals
classified as meeting at least two high risk indicators (i.e. perceived job insecurity, no job tenure or part-time contract) are defined
as ρ2, those with at least two low risk indicators are defined as ρ1 and those who have been laid off as ρ3 (see FIGURE 2).
The left panel plots the income distribution by risk type. Although having a different
mean and distribution probabilities, individual risk occurs across the income distribution. This
may imply that differences in social spending preferences merely reflect an income effect. The
right panel though clarifies this is unlikely to be the case. Specifically, for the same income
level, secure workers are shown to demand lower spending than the unemployed.
I proceed by estimating individual specific redistribution demands, a model that could ac-
count for unobserved individual heterogeneity.7 When an individual is followed for a lengthy
period of time, as here, the unobserved effects could also be interpreted as capturing features
of the individual such as motivation or early family upbringing. The panel data setup is con-
venient as it makes possible to track individuals over time. Essentially, if an individual’s labor
market risk changes across time and this affects her spending preferences, then the estimated
coefficients would capture this effect. Equation 1 describes the model that includes individual
fixed effects and time-varying controls X* such as income, education, civil status and wealth.
SSict = τ1ρ1ict + τ2ρ2ict +ζ X*ict +ξi +θc +λt + εict (1)
TABLE 1 reports the results. All models include time fixed effects (λt), capturing the
7This specification relies on the assumption that treatment effects remain constant over time, and this is more
likely when the proportion of never-treated individuals is large (Imai and Kim, 2020), as noted in the Appendix.
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NOTE: The left panel plots the income distribution by risk type. The right panel explores this relationship with respect to demand for
social spending and shows predicted levels of spending support by risk type and income. Estimates are based on a linear probability
model, and presented along with their 95% confidence interval based on clustered robust standard errors.
influence of aggregate time trends. Subnational unemployment rates tend to be higher in the
French- and Italian- speaking cantons than in the German-speaking ones, which explains the
notable different levels of social spending demands. Interestingly, there is quite some variation
even within regions speaking the same language. In order to address this issue empirically, all
models include canton fixed effects (θc). For ease of interpretation, all models present results
of a linear probability estimation, and the coefficients can directly be interpreted as percentage
points change in the dependent variable associated with each covariate.
The outcome of interest is support for higher levels of social spending. Model (1) serves
as a reference to the relationship between risk exposure and social spending demands. Model
(2) includes a restricted set of time-variant covariates, such as income and education. The coef-
ficients capturing labor market risk continue to posit a statistically significant relationship be-
tween individual-based risk exposure and social spending demand. Finally, model (3) includes
a comprehensive vector of time-varying covariates, which includes, apart from income and ed-
ucation, a respondent’s civil status and wealth (in the form of real estate ownership). Given the
use of a within-individual estimator, these coefficients inform how, on average, social spending
demands compare across different risk exposure categories for a given individual. Therefore,
a secure worker (with risk ρ1) is expected to demand, on average, 5 percentage points less
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TABLE 1: FIXED EFFECTS ANALYSIS: RISK AND SOCIAL SPENDING DEMAND
(1) (2) (3)
Social Spending Social Spending Social Spending
Risk ρ2 -0.03** -0.03** -0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Risk ρ1 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Individual FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Canton FE X X X
Controls X X XX
Observations 39,764 39,764 39,764
NOTE: The outcome is binary denoting whether the respondent supports more social spending. The second
model includes time-variant controls for income, education and region, whereas the third model includes, in
addition, time-varying controls for home ownership, and civil status. Standard errors are clustered at the unit
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
spending than during her unemployment and 2 percentage points less spending than during her
time in precarious work. In sum, this exercise finds that changes in individuals’ labor market
position translate into changes in social spending demand.
Robustness Checks
The foregoing discussion suggested that risk may not be homogeneous within an occu-
pation, and that consequently, inferring individuals’ economic experiences from occupational
information might conceal greater variation in risk – fact which is also depicted in FIGURE
D.8.8 But if risk is not homogeneous within occupations, is it within risk types? FIGURE D.6
plots the difference between the various combinations of objective and subjective measures
from FIGURE 2 and estimates their effect on spending demand for precarious (risk ρ2) and se-
cure (risk ρ1) workers. The null-effects imply that the groups are indeed homogeneous in their
redistribution preferences.
An empirical limitation of most measures of risk is that they cannot account for the possi-
bility that preferences change over time. This is is the case for measures such as skill-specificity,
RTI or offshoring. This, however, is possible with OUR and the proposed classification, as
8Additionally, FIGURE D.2 reports the distribution of precarious and secure workers within each occupational
risk measure.
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shown in FIGURE D.7 and D.9. Comparing how the two measures perform over time, it ap-
pears that both measures pick up variance in risk and preferences over time, but that the OUR
measure bundles together high and risk occupations, making most of them indistinguishable.
Also, individuals working in occupations with higher unemployment rates sometimes demand
just as much or even less spending than more sheltered occupations. By contrast, the three
groups proposed in this paper do maintain their predicted differences in demand across time.
I test the validity of the insurance mechanism against a placebo outcome and the ‘im-
pressionable’ year hypothesis. First, I use the proposed risk classification to test whether it
significantly affects individuals’ support for unrelated policy domains such as nuclear energy
spending. If risk exposure were not the mechanism linking the individual’s labor market status
to insurance demands, then one may expect differences among individuals also with respect to
such policies. The null results reported in model (1) of TABLE D.3 validate the mechanism.
Relatedly, it is important to note that individuals’ preferences may be more volatile during
their socialization period or ‘impressionable’ years (Sears, 1981). This opens the possibility
that changes in preferences occur among the youth and may not necessarily be related to the
individuals’ risk exposure. Following the trajectory of attitudinal stability presented in Dinas
(2013), I restrict the sample to those over 25 years old (TABLE D.3 model (6)) corresponding
to probabilities of less than .5 of an attitude change. Therefore, the chosen cut-off seems to
capture individuals who have passed the ‘impressionable years’ and reached political maturity.
The estimates suggest that including only adults who have reached attitudinal stability does not
affect the interpretation of the main results. Finally, Table D.3 reports the robustness of the
results following the inclusion of local time trends and several time-varying covariates such as
ideology, membership in a trade union, and employment in the public sector.
Discussion
This paper has introduced a new approach to evaluating personal labor market risk and its
impact on redistribution preferences that addresses two important shortcomings in earlier work.
First, previous researchers have assessed this relationship by imputing to individuals risk from
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occupation or sectoral characteristics. This, importantly, may overlook important variation in
risk within occupations. Second, earlier work relied on cross-sectional comparisons capturing
risk and preferences only at a given point in time. This means that over-time variation in
individuals’ experiences is not captured. I attempted to obtain a more realistic measure of risk
by relaxing these assumptions. Although the method suggested can be applied to measure risk
in any system, I focus on Switzerland as this is a very unlikely case for labor market risk to
manifest. Using data from a long ran panel data, this paper may have a better claim at causality
than previous research.
I argued that aggregate shocks or local trends make within-occupation inequality espe-
cially prominent across firms and regions, and that this may vary hetorgeneously over time.
Although structural changes in the labor market have created labor markets increasingly re-
liant on precarious jobs, these processes have obvious macro-level industrial and occupational
effects, but ultimately impact on job characteristics. I suggested one way to synthesize these
sources of variation is to assert their likely impact on observable risk characteristics, such as
contract type or job tenure, and on unobservable characteristics in objective terms, but where
subjective expectations may expose private information. Consequently, I proposed a dynamic
approach that integrates the objective and subjective facets of risk and argued these map onto
three risk types – those in secure jobs, those expecting or likely to lose their jobs and those
who have lost their jobs. I extended this framework to the study of redistribution preferences
and showed that a dynamic relationship exists and that a change in risk changes redistribution
support.
Two main implications regarding aggregate demand for redistribution may be derived.
The first concerns the identity of the median voter. Based on labor shares, this paper follows
the standard view of occupational-based risk arguments by positioning the median voter as a
secure worker. In my framework, the median voter is easily identified as that holding a se-
cure job, whereas this is not clear under alternative explanations, where the occupation of the
median voter is not the same across specifications, as FIGURE 1 set out. Therefore, thinking
of public opinion shifts, this framework could provide traction in understanding whose prefer-
ences change. A second implication concerns the role of occupations in coalition-formation.
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If individuals are more likely to perceive risk as clustering alongside types of jobs (secure vs
insecure) rather than across macro-societal groups (such as class or occupation), then the lack
of a clear structure in organizing individuals’ interests is likely to unveil obvious coordination
problems, and inference about individuals’ support for populist appeals in favour of the ‘forgot-
ten’ people. Future research should therefore consider to what extent coordination problems in
articulating spending preferences matter and how an increasing pool of highly risk exposed in-
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